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Abstract.
The commission of genocide and other large-scale international crimes typically involves a multitude
of perpetrators acting in concert. As such, the pursuit of individual criminal accountability following
the perpetration of mass crimes has involved oft-controversial decisions of whom to prosecute. This
challenge is exemplified by the ongoing controversy in Cambodia concerning the proper scope of
prosecutions at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) for the crimes of
the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975-1979, as the Court’s third and fourth cases have languished
amidst considerable controversy for years. This paper examines whether the presumed suspects in
the two cases legally qualify as individuals “most responsible” for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge
period in Cambodia by considering known information about each suspect in light of available
international criminal law jurisprudence and argues that all suspects fall well within any reasonable
legal definition of the term “most responsible” as each is implicated directly in extremely grave
crimes. As such, it is concluded that there is no viable legal alternative available to bring the two cases
to a close save for trial.
Keywords.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and
Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
DeFalco, Randle C. (2014) "Cases 003 and 004 at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Definition of “Most Responsible” Individuals




Khmer Rouge, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), International Criminal
Law, Personal Jurisdiction
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp
Randle C. DeFalco, “Cases 003 and 004 at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Definition of ‘Most Responsible’ Individuals According 
to International Criminal Law,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 8, 2 (Spring 2014): 45-65. ©2014 Genocide Studies and Prevention. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.8.2.6
Randle C. DeFalco
Legal Advisor to The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)
Abstract: The commission of genocide and other large-scale international crimes typically involves a multitude of perpetrators 
acting in concert. As such, the pursuit of individual criminal accountability following the perpetration of mass crimes has 
involved oft-controversial decisions of whom to prosecute. This challenge is exemplified by the ongoing controversy in 
Cambodia concerning the proper scope of prosecutions at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 
for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975-1979, as the Court’s third and fourth cases have languished amidst 
considerable controversy for years. This paper examines whether the presumed suspects in the two cases legally qualify as 
individuals “most responsible” for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia by considering known information 
about each suspect in light of available international criminal law jurisprudence and argues that all suspects fall well within 
any reasonable legal definition of the term “most responsible” as each is implicated directly in extremely grave crimes. As such, 
it is concluded that there is no viable legal alternative available to bring the two cases to a close save for trial. 
Keywords: Khmer Rouge, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), International Criminal Law, 
Personal Jurisdiction
Introduction
The commission of genocide and other international crimes are typically large-scale group undertakings. 
As a result, the selection of whom to prosecute has presented a recurring challenge for international criminal 
law (“ICL”) practitioners in post-atrocity situations.1 Within ICL practice to date, prosecutors have primarily 
targeted individuals who held positions of significant power or were implicated in especially grave crimes.2 
Meanwhile, lower-profile national or military courts have been sometimes utilized to prosecute less notorious 
perpetrators.3
The difficulty of selecting the proper scope of prosecutions following mass atrocity crimes is exemplified 
by the long-simmering controversy concerning how many suspects will ultimately be prosecuted at the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), a special hybrid wing of the Cambodian 
judiciary created in collaboration with the United Nations (“UN”), commonly referred to as the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal.4 The Khmer Rouge held power in Cambodia from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.5 During this 
time, when the country was officially renamed Democratic Kampuchea (“DK”), extremely grave international 
crimes were undoubtedly committed against millions of victims by thousands of individual perpetrators. In 
designing the ECCC, the Cambodian government and UN agreed, following protracted negotiations, that the 
Court would have “personal jurisdiction over senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were 
most responsible” for specified international and domestic crimes committed in Cambodia during the Khmer 
Rouge’s reign.6
This paper considers the meaning of the phrase “most responsible” at the ECCC in relation to highly 
controversial Cases 003 and 004 at the Court, which have languished in their pre-trial investigatory phases for 
years. More specifically, this paper argues that the term should be interpreted in accordance with prevailing 
ICL jurisprudence and suggests that all suspects in the two cases fall well within the purview of any reasonable 
legal interpretation of the term “most responsible.” As such, it is concluded that there is no legitimate legal 
mechanism – other than trials – available to bring Cases 003/004 to proper conclusions and thus, any effort to 
shutter the cases must be viewed as a product of considerations extraneous to the legal principles applicable 
to the ECCC.
To make this argument, a brief overview of the convoluted and controversial histories of Cases 003/004 
is provided, followed by an explanation of why resort to ICL jurisprudence for the ECCC to properly interpret 
the term “most responsible” is warranted by both law and simple necessity. Next, an overview of relevant ICL 
jurisprudence concerning personal jurisdiction and relative culpability assessments, drawn from the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and to a 
more limited extent, International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is provided.7 This jurisprudence is then compared 
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to the known facts concerning the suspects in ECCC Cases 003/004. Through this analysis it is argued that 
due to the extreme gravity of the criminal allegations against all suspects in both cases, combined with the 
apparent high degree of responsibility therein of each respective suspect, all four presumed suspects in the 
two cases fall squarely within the class of persons properly considered “most responsible” for the crimes 
committed during the DK period in Cambodia. While this conclusion may be politically and/or financially 
inconvenient for certain stakeholders and interested parties, from a legal standpoint this paper asserts it is 
essentially unavoidable and thus, should the cases be dismissed ostensibly on personal jurisdictional grounds, 
such action would deeply compromise the already fragile integrity of the ECCC as a legal institution. Thus, it 
is further concluded that should Case 003 or 004 be shuttered prior to trial, a better course would be for the 
ECCC, UN, Cambodian government, donors and other stakeholders to simply admit that a lack of resources 
and/or willpower to proceed with the cases are the cause in order to protect the overall legal integrity of the 
Court and by extension, any judgements reached in Cases 001 and 002.8
The Case 003/004 Controversy in Cambodia
The ECCC utilizes a civil law process involving an investigation instigated by the Court’s Co-Prosecutors9, 
but largely carried out by two Co-Investigating Judges (“CIJs”).10 The ECCC Co-Prosecutors are duty-bound 
to submit an “Introductory Submission” to the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges (“OCIJ”), triggering an 
official investigation of a suspect, when they develop “reason to believe” that the suspect(s) in question is 
implicated in crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdiction.11 Once seized by an Introductory Submission, the CIJs 
have a “compulsory” duty to investigate the allegations contained in the submission, seeking both inculpatory 
and exculpatory evidence, and thereafter to issue a “Closing Order” that either commits the suspect(s) to trial 
and specifies which charge(s) will be adjudicated or alternatively, dismisses all charges effectively ending the 
case.12 It is within this investigative phase that Cases 003/004 have languished amidst considerable controversy 
since being initiated by then-International Co-Prosecutor Robert Petit on 7 September 2009.13
There is widespread speculation that the Cambodian government is working to prevent both cases from 
proceeding to trial. National ECCC Co-Prosecutor Chea Leang opposed the initiation of Cases 003/004,14 
leading to Petit proceeding alone with the filing of Introductory Submissions in both cases.15 One widely 
cited example of the government’s apparent opposition to Cases 003/004 occurred in 2010, when Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen reportedly “clearly affirmed that case three is not allowed” during a meeting with 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.16 Although since such time, Cambodian government officials have 
been more equivocal when commenting on the two cases, the perception that the government monolithically 
opposes the two cases remains largely in place and is routinely repeated by international media outlets when 
discussing the cases. Such a perception undoubtedly sends powerful signals to Cambodians with some stake in 
either case and public perception of the wishes of elite political figures in Cambodia often strongly influences 
local decision-making processes. In regards to Cases 003/004, the perception that Prime Minister Hun Sen’s 
ruling Cambodian People’s Party continues to oppose trials is both reflected and further reinforced by the fact 
that Cambodian lawyers, judges and staff at the ECCC have consistently opposed efforts by their international 
colleagues to move either case along towards trial.
Throughout 2011, the OCIJ was subjected to a steady stream of criticism from rights groups and jurists, 
who accused National Co-Investigation Judge You Bunleng and then-International Co-Investigating Judge 
Siegfried Blunk of colluding to scuttle Cases 003/004 at the behest of the Cambodian government.17 These 
criticisms grew louder when the still-confidential Introductory Submissions in both cases were leaked by 
an online New Zealand news organization, as the two documents detailed allegations of extremely grave 
crimes.18 In April 2011, the Co-Investigating Judges closed the investigation into Case 003, but refrained from 
issuing the official Closing Order necessary to end the case or commit it for trial, leaving it in a state of legal 
limbo.19 Next, in August of 2011, Co-Investigating Judges You and Blunk released a list of crimes sites relevant 
to Case 004 in a document in which both judges expressed “serious doubts whether the suspects [in Case 004] 
are ‘most responsible’.”20 This disclosure also confirmed that the Case 004 investigation focused on crime sites 
widely believed to be locations where hundreds of thousands of victims were killed during the DK period.21
Eventually, amidst mounting criticism and allegations of investigatory misconduct, Judge Blunk resigned 
in October 2011, citing the appearance of political interference as his motivation.22 Blunk’s replacement, 
Reserve International Co-Investigating Judge Laurent Kasper-Ansermet, publicly vowed to aggressively 
investigate Cases 003/004,23 but was in turn, blocked from officially removing the “reserve” tag from his 
title by the Cambodian Supreme Council of Magistracy, which withheld its perfunctory acknowledgment 
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of Kasper-Ansermet’s succession.24 Judge You (who incidentally, sits on the Supreme Council of Magistracy 
along with ECCC National Co-Prosecutor Chea Leang) also refused to work with Judge Kasper-Ansermet in 
any capacity, stating in a press release that Judge Kasper-Ansermet “lack[ed] legal authority” to perform any 
duties as an investigating judge.25 Nonetheless, Judge Kasper-Ansermet began to investigate both cases and 
attempted to officially reopen the Case 003 investigation.26 Eventually, after being stonewalled in his efforts 
to investigate for months, Judge Kasper-Ansermet, clearly frustrated by the efforts to block his attempts to 
investigate Cases 003/004, stated that he was unable to continue fulfilling his duties due to the “dysfunctional” 
climate within the OCIJ and tendered his own resignation.27 His resignation was followed in short order 
by Judge Kasper-Ansermet releasing a series of decisions revealing the steps taken by national ECCC staff 
members to stymie his attempts to investigate Cases 003/004.28 Judge Kasper-Ansermet also released two 
further decisions in which he opined that both suspects in Case 003 qualify as “most responsible” under 
ECCC Law and therefore the Case 003 investigation should continue.29
The UN appealed for cooperation from the Cambodian government in appointing a new International 
Co-Investigating Judge30 and Judge Mark Harmon was approved as the new Co-Investigating Judge on 26 
October 2012.31 The rift between the national and international officers at the ECCC over pursuing these cases 
appears to remain however. On 19 December 2012 Judge Harmon unilaterally released a document detailing 
fourteen additional crime sites he was investigating for Case 004 without any comment from his counterpart, 
Judge You.32 Next, on 28 February 2013, Judges Harmon and You issued a joint press release that contained 
separate and diametrically opposed statements concerning Case 003 and whether the investigation was 
ongoing or completed.33 Since Judge Harmon’s appointment he has proceeded with his investigatory duties, 
while Judge You has indicated that he will not investigate either case any further.34 Meanwhile, the pressing 
need to move forward in a timely manner was underscored in March 2013 with the death of ECCC Case 002 
accused Ieng Sary and again in June 2013 with the death of presumed Case 003 suspect Sou Met. Nevertheless, 
even as the ECCC’s flagship Case 002 nears a trial judgment the first of a planned series of discrete trials, Cases 
003/004 continue to languish amidst considerable uncertainty35 and subject to a fundamental divide between 
the Court’s national and international judges and staff.36
While the fate of Cases 003/004 remains tenuously uncertain, this paper argues that as the ECCC was 
created to provide a measure of justice for the millions of Cambodians who suffered under the Khmer Rouge 
regime and to also help improve the rule of law in Cambodia by serving as a model judicial institution, the 
only legitimate course of action at this juncture is for the Court to pursue each existing case to its proper legal 
conclusion, based upon a thorough review of all available evidence. As pointed out by Robert Petit’s successor, 
now-departed ECCC International Co-Prosecutor Andrew Cayley, “the importance of [Cases 003/004] more 
than anything, whatever happens at the end, is that the Cambodian people see a proper legal process taking 
place.”37 This statement underscores the importance of seeing Case 003/004 through for the overall integrity 
of the ECCC as a legal institution, to both protect the legacy of the Court’s other cases and to ensure that the 
Court cannot be seen as condoning the political interference and corruption that currently runs rampant 
throughout Cambodia’s national judicial system.38 Thus, whether Cases 003/004 reach their proper legal 
conclusions will serve to either stand against, or reinforce the current rampant subversion of the rule of law in 
the service of the interests of Cambodia’s political elite.
An Exercise in Discretion: Interpreting the Term “Most Responsible”
a. The Duch Appeal Judgment: A “Policy Guide”
While the controversy concerning the future of Cases 003/004 has endured, key jurisprudence concerning 
the meaning of the jurisdictional language covering those “most responsible” and “senior leaders” in the 
Agreement and ECCC Law has emerged. On 3 February 2012, the ECCC’s highest body, the Supreme Court 
Chamber (“SCC”), handed down its first judgment, in Case 001, concluding the case against accused former 
Khmer Rouge prison chief Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch.39 In its judgment, the Chamber dismissed the defence’s 
argument that Duch falls outside of the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC and increased his sentence from 
35 years to a life term.40 On the issue of personal jurisdiction, the Chamber held that the jurisdiction of the 
ECCC is limited to “senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge who are among the most responsible [and] non-senior 
leaders of the Khmer Rouge who are [also] among the most responsible.”41 The Chamber therefore held any 
Khmer Rouge official considered “most responsible” is a proper prosecutorial target at the ECCC.
The Chamber retreated however, from interpreting the qualifiers “senior leaders” and “most responsible” 
as true justiciable jurisdictional requirements later in its judgment, holding further that:
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The terms ‘senior leaders’ and ‘most responsible’ are not jurisdictional requirements […], but operate 
exclusively as investigatorial and prosecutorial policy to guide the independent discretion of the [CIJs] and 
Co-Prosecutors as to how best to target their finite resources […]42
Concerning the phrase “most responsible”, the Chamber reasoned that the term must be interpreted as 
a guide to discretion rather than true jurisdictional requirement for three main reasons: (1) “[t]here is no 
objective method for the Trial Chamber to decide on, compare, and then rank the criminal responsibility of 
all Khmer Rouge officials”; (2) “the notion of comparative criminal responsibility is inconsistent” with the ban 
on “the defence of superior orders”; and (3) “the determination of whether an accused is ‘most responsible’ 
requires a large amount of discretion.”43 The import of the SCC’s holding is that “an accused before the ECCC 
cannot object to the Trial Chamber’s jurisdiction on the basis that the [CIJs] did not limit the indictment 
to ‘senior leaders’ or the ‘most responsible’, absent a showing that the [CIJs] abused their discretion.”44 The 
Chamber further noted that the “power of review by the Trial Chamber [regarding personal jurisdiction 
decisions] is extremely narrow in scope” and requires demonstrating “bad faith, or a showing of unsound 
professional judgment.”45 The Chamber also importantly noted that in the likely scenario that the two CIJs 
disagree and where the “reason for disagreement on the execution of an action, decision, or order is whether 
or not a suspect or charged person is a ‘senior leader’ or ‘most responsible’” then, absent a super-majority 
decision to the contrary by the appellate ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘the investigation shall proceed.’”46 The 
Case 001 Appeal Judgment thus renders determinations of who qualifies as “most responsible” a policy 
guidance tool, rather than true jurisdiction element, bounded solely by the outer limits of good-faith and 
sound professional decision-making.
While the Case 001 Appeal Judgment answered some of the most pressing questions concerning the 
meaning of the terms “senior leader” and “most responsible”, the SCC failed to indicate what factors are properly 
considered in making such inherently subjective determinations. As it currently stands, whether Cases 003/004 
can be shuttered prior to trial without violating the ECCC’s foundational legal documents turns on the issues 
of the proper bounds of judicial discretion and sound professional judgment in interpreting the phrases “senior 
leader” and “most responsible” within the Agreement and ECCC Law. This paper argues that because the 
meaning of the term “most responsible” is not readily apparent, defined in the travaux préparatoires relevant 
to the ECCC or in any other source of law or interpretation directly applicable to the Court, guidance must be 
sought from international law in determining the proper factors that must be considered in order for relevant 
ECCC authorities to exercise sound professional judgment in determining whether a suspect before the ECCC 
qualifies as a “most responsible.” Furthermore, such jurisprudence dictates that to make such an assessment, the 
gravity of the alleged crime(s) and level of contribution thereto by the suspect in question must be considered 
and compared relative to other cases before the same court or tribunal. According to this process of analysis, 
because each of the presumed suspects in Cases 003/004 are implicated as key players in the perpetration of 
extremely grave crimes, involving the systematic abuse and killing of many thousands of victims, each suspect 
should be presumptively considered amongst those “most responsible.” Any other conclusion would be contrary 
to basic logic and therefore presumptively the product of bad faith and/or unsound professional judgment.
b. Interpreting ECCC Law
The Agreement establishing the ECCC is a bilateral treaty to which the UN and Cambodia are parties. 
The ECCC Law is legislation passed to effectuate the terms of the Agreement. As such, both documents are 
to be interpreted according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states: “A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”47
In his departing decisions regarding personal jurisdiction and the suspects in Case 003, Judge Laurent 
Kasper-Ansermet noted the holdings of the SCC in Case 001 and acknowledged that the gravity of the alleged 
crimes and the suspect’s relative degree of responsibility therein are the two main factors to consider regarding 
assessing whether a suspect qualifies as “most responsible.”48 The decisions also conform with ICL practice, as 
is demonstrated infra in this paper.49 Scholar Steve Heder and former United States Ambassador-at-Large for 
War Crimes Issues and current UN Special Expert on the ECCC David Scheffer50 have both provided detailed 
overviews of the negotiations and associated travaux préparatoires leading to the Agreement and ultimate 
formation of the ECCC.51 While both scholars offer important insights into the protracted negotiations that 
culminated in the Court’s creation, they both only go so far as to reach the general conclusion that at no point 
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was there any agreement – tacit or otherwise – between the UN and Cambodia that the ECCC would prosecute 
a specific, limited number of individuals or that the precise identities of whom would be prosecuted were 
decided prior to the formation of the Court. Heder further concludes that while the Cambodian government 
may have not been pleased with the necessity of ceding power to ECCC investigators, prosecutors and judges 
to decide who would be investigated and tried, such a concession is inherent in Cambodia’s signature, as 
UN officials were unequivocal that suspects could not be pre-selected.52 Scheffer similarly concludes that 
determinations of which suspects qualify as “most responsible” must be made pursuant to a reasonable 
interpretation of the term and questions whether under any such reasonable formulation, the likely suspects 
in Cases 003 and 004 could properly be considered to not qualify as “most responsible.”53
The conclusions of both Heder and Scheffer thus both beg the question of how ECCC lawyers and judges 
are to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the term “most responsible”, especially given that the term is not 
explicitly defined anywhere in the Agreement or ECCC Law. The Agreement itself provides for the procedure 
to be utilized in precisely such an instance of interpretive lack of clarity. Article 12(1) states:
The procedure shall be in accordance with Cambodian law. Where Cambodian law does not deal with a 
particular matter, or where there is uncertainty regarding the interpretation or application of a relevant rule 
of Cambodian law, or where there is a question regarding the consistency of such a rule with international 
standards, guidance may also be sought in procedural rules established at the international level.
This process of interpretive guidance is echoed in the ECCC Law Articles 20 new, 23 new and 33 new, 
which direct the Co-Prosecutors, Co-Investigating Judges and Trial Chamber Judges respectively, to remedy 
uncertainty regarding interpretation or application of the procedures applicable to the ECCC by seeking 
guidance in procedural rules established at the international level.54
c. The Bounds of Discretion and Sound Professional Judgment
Given that resort to the ordinary meaning of the term “most responsible” provides little guidance in the 
context of personal jurisdiction for international crimes and (as demonstrated by Heder and Scheffer) the 
negotiating history and travaux préparatoires simply establish that the precise number of suspects was never 
agreed upon, Article 12(1) of the Agreement clearly dictates that Cambodian law should next be canvassed 
for potential guidance. Personal jurisdictional regimes predicated on relative degrees of culpability, however, 
are inimical to the very foundation of typical domestic criminal legal regimes, as in most domestic criminal 
prosecutions it is assumed that any person suspected of a serious crime will be investigated and, if the evidence 
warrants, committed to trial. There is no space in such systems for prosecutors or judges to determine that 
an individual may be responsible for a very serious crime, yet is not a proper suspect to commit to trial 
because he or she does not fall amongst those “most responsible” for the crime in question. Instead, domestic 
penal codes presuppose that if there is sufficient evidence implicating an individual in a crime, they will be 
prosecuted without any further inquiry necessary.55
In light of this general assumption that serious crimes will be prosecuted according to the evidence, 
unsurprisingly there are no provisions within Cambodian penal law that provide guidance in interpreting 
what individuals are properly considered “most responsible” for international crimes. Instead, the Criminal 
Procedure Code of the Kingdom of Cambodia, adopted and entered into force in 2007 by the Cambodian 
Ministry of Justice,56 only provides limited guidance concerning the conduct of pre-trial investigatory 
procedures and duties and the basic boundaries of discretion in regard to these procedures. On this topic, 
the Code is similar in many ways to the investigatory procedures in place at the ECCC itself. The Code 
dictates that in domestic prosecutions, a prosecutor instigates an investigation. And via a “requisition”, the 
prosecutor confers mandatory jurisdiction on an investigating judge to complete an investigation.57 In regards 
to investigatory discretion, Article 122 of the Code dictates that investigations are “mandatory” for felonies 
and “optional” for misdemeanors.58 This limited discretion takes place when an investigating judge receives a 
requisition from the prosecutor and once an investigation commences, Article 127 of the Code dictates that 
the presiding investigating judge “shall perform all investigations that are useful to ascertaining the facts” and 
further, “shall have the obligation to investigate for charging or acquitting.”59 These mandatory duties mirror 
those which appear in the ECCC’s Internal Rules, which dictate that the Co-Prosecutors “shall” open an 
investigation when they have reason to believe a crime within the ECCC’s jurisdiction has been committed60 
and that judicial investigations are “compulsory for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ECCC.”61
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In order to conclude a domestic criminal investigation, an investigating Cambodian judge must issue 
a “settlement warrant”62 which is similar to the mandatory “Closing Order” at the ECCC.63 The domestic 
settlement warrant forwards a case for trial or dismissal, the latter in the form of a “non-suit” order.64 Article 
247 of the Cambodian Criminal Procedure Code further states that the “investigating judge shall issue a 
non-suit order in the following circumstances: (1) The act committed was not a felony, misdemeanor or petty 
offense; (2) The perpetrators who committed acts are still not known; [or] (3) There is not enough evidence 
to charge the accused person.
 There is no indication of other discretionary grounds upon which an investigating judge can issue a 
non-suit order or otherwise decline to forward a case for trial, but each settlement warrant “shall always 
bear reasons”65 and is appealable to the appellate Investigation Chamber of the Cambodian judiciary. The 
settlement warrant procedure utilized in ordinary Cambodian criminal courts can be contrasted with Rule 
67(3) of the ECCC’s Internal Rules, which states that the “Co-Investigating Judges shall issue a Dismissal 
Order in the following circumstances: (1) The acts in question do not amount to crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the ECCC; (2) The perpetrators of the acts have not been identified; or (3) There is not sufficient evidence 
against the Charged Person or persons of the charges.”66
As with the Cambodian Criminal Procedure Code, nowhere in any law directly applicable to the ECCC, 
is it suggested that additional, discretionary grounds exist upon which the Co-Investigating Judges can choose 
to issue a Dismissal Order.
Article 261 of the Cambodian Criminal Code also dictates that when receiving a complaint concerning 
an investigation, the appellate Investigation Chamber “shall examine the regularity of the procedures and the 
good conduct of the proceedings [and if] a reason for annulling is found, the Investigation Chamber may 
discretionarily nullify the whole or parts of such proceedings.”67 The Investigation Chamber may order further 
investigation if it deems such an act “useful” and can appoint one of its sitting judges to assume the authority 
of an investigating judge in order to do so.68 If the Investigation Chamber takes over an investigation, the judge 
appointed by the Chamber conducts further investigation and the Chamber concludes the investigation in the 
same manner as the original investigating judge, by issuing a settlement warrant either committing a suspect 
to trial or directing issuance of a non-suit.69
Consequently, Cambodian law provides scant guidance in sketching the boundaries of the discretion 
ECCC Co-Investigating Judges enjoy in assessing which suspects are properly considered either “senior 
leaders” or “most responsible” for the crimes committed during the DK period in Cambodia. For the most part, 
Cambodian criminal procedural law mirrors the provisions in place at the ECCC, found in the ECCC Law and 
ECCC Rules, which dictate that investigations are mandatory for crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdiction, all 
of which are clearly serious and that for such serious crimes, dismissal prior to trial is only a proper outcome 
when the evidence against a suspect is deficient in some way critical to a successful prosecution. Thus, if 
anything, a comparative analysis of Cambodian and ECCC procedural law governing investigatory powers 
suggests that discretion to dismiss charges against individuals who could likely be successfully prosecuted for 
serious crimes should be construed extremely narrowly, as such a power is not explicitly provided for in either 
body of law.
d. The Need for International Legal Guidance
In sum, there was no clear consensus amongst the drafters of the Agreement concerning the definition 
of the term “most responsible” within the Agreement and ECCC Law. Similarly, nowhere in law directly 
applicable to the ECCC or Cambodian penal law is there any mention of concept of discretionary investigatory 
trial committal powers predicated on assessments of the relative culpability amongst criminal suspects or 
suggesting a definition of the term “most responsible.” Indeed, this outcome is wholly unsurprising, as limited 
personal jurisdictional regimes over serious crimes based on relative assessments of individual culpability are 
solely and distinctly features of ICL.
Furthermore, resorting to the “object and purpose” of the Agreement to seek insight into the proper 
definition of the term, as dictated by the Vienna Convention, results in problems of circularity, as the stated 
object and purpose of the Agreement itself is to bring to justice “senior leaders” and others “most responsible” 
for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge period.70 There is no apparent plain meaning of the term that would 
make any sense within criminal proceedings and because Cambodian law is predictably provides little help in 
defining this jurisdictional concept, both the Agreement and ECCC Law dictate that international law should 
be turned to for assistance in arriving at this critical determination.
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As demonstrated below, while international law intentionally refrains from providing an explicit 
universal definition of relative levels of culpability, ICL jurisprudence does suggest what types of individuals 
presumptively qualify as amongst those “most responsible” and clearly dictates that any proper decision 
concerning the relative culpability of an individual must be based on an appraisal of the gravity of the alleged 
crime(s) and the suspect’s degree of responsibility therein. This assessment process must also use other 
suspects/accused tried by the same authority as comparative benchmarks in order to avoid inconsistent or 
conflicting results.
e. The Concept of “Most Responsible” According to International Criminal Law
Once one determines that it is necessary to look to international law for guidance in interpreting the 
term “most responsible” at the ECCC, one must next consider where to look for useful legal principles. 
Given that limited jurisdictional regimes based on relative culpability assessments are wholly unique to 
ICL, jurisprudence from this discipline appears to be good place to start. Indeed, a robust jurisprudence 
from the SCSL, ICTY and to a lesser extent, ICC on issues of relative culpability, personal jurisdiction and 
the selection of suspects, combine to offer some helpful guiding principles on the key issue of the proper 
process and considerations in assessing issues of relative culpability. Practice at these courts and tribunals 
clearly demonstrate that the two main considerations in determining culpability are the gravity of the alleged 
crimes and the degree of responsibility therein of the individual in question. Moreover, within existing ICL 
jurisprudence, gravity and responsibility are to be considered within the context of the overall historical 
narrative at issue and in comparison to other cases, though not in an overly formal or mathematical fashion.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The “Greatest Responsibility”
In 2000, the UN Security Council requested the formation of a court with “personal jurisdiction over 
persons who bear the greatest responsibility” for the commission of international crimes within Sierra Leone.71 
The result was the SCSL, a hybrid court created pursuant to a treaty between the UN and the government of 
Sierra Leone with the mandate “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 
November 1996.”72 Article 1 of the SCSL Statute confers “the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law.”73
The phrase “greatest responsibility” was a topic of much debate prior to the creation of the SCSL. Then 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that this language should be “understood as an indication of a 
limitation on the number of accused by reference to their command authority and the gravity and scale of the 
crimes [and] propose[d] that the more general term ‘persons most responsible’ should be used” and observed:
While those ‘most responsible’ obviously include the political or military leadership, others in command 
authority down the chain of command may also be regarded ‘most responsible’ judging by the severity of the 
crime or its massive scale. ‘Most responsible’, therefore, denotes both a leadership or authority position of the 
Accused, and a sense of the gravity, seriousness or massive scale of the crime.74
Ultimately, the SCSL employed the narrower term “greatest responsibility” in its Statute and this phrase 
was held to operate solely as a guide to prosecutorial discretion.75 The Court’s Appeals Chamber held the 
SCSL Statute, which makes the Prosecutor responsible “for the investigation and prosecution of persons who 
bear the greatest responsibility,” renders determinations of which individuals are suitable for prosecution a 
matter of prosecutorial discretion unsuitable for judicial review.76 The Chamber emphasized the need for the 
Prosecutor to “act independently [and] not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any 
other source” and concluded in the Prosecutor v. Brima et al. judgment that it would be:
inconceivable that after a long and expensive trial the Trial Chamber could conclude that although the 
commission of serious crimes has been established beyond reasonable doubt against the Accused, the 
indictment ought to be struck out on the ground that it has not been proved that the Accused was not one of 
those who bore the greatest responsibility.77
The Chamber did note however, that a “good-faith” standard applies to the exercise of discretion by the 
Prosecutor.78
52
©2014      Genocide Studies and Prevention 8, no. 2  http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.8.2.6
DeFalco
The SCSL Prosecutor ultimately brought charges against a total of twelve individuals, resulting 
nine convictions and the deaths of three accused prior to judgment.79 These twelve accused held various 
positions in the three main parties to the Sierra Leonean conflict the SCSL was created to account for: 
the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”), Civil Defence Forces (“CDF”) and Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (“AFRC”). The accused ranged from overall commanders to others who held significant positions, 
but were clearly subordinated to the highest echelons of power. For example, in Prosecutor v Sesay et 
al., The SCSL Trial Chamber found that accused Augustine Gbao “was not a member of the AFRC/RUF 
Supreme Council [responsible for decision-making]” and remained in a single district during the period 
the AFRC/RUF held power.80 Nonetheless, the “Chamber found that Gbao was an ideology instructor 
and that ideology played a significant role in the RUF movement [and within] RUF controlled territory, 
[Gbao’s unit] was responsible for the enforcement of discipline and law and order.”81 In Prosecutor v Fofana 
& Kondewa, accused Allieu Kondewa was the “High Priest” of the CDF responsible for recruitment of new 
members and holding ceremonies that supposedly immunized combatants from bullets prior to battles.82 
The Appeals Chamber upheld Kondewa’s convictions, finding that as High Priest, Kondewa “had authority 
and power to issue oral and written directives; that he could order investigations for misconduct and hold 
court hearings; and that he had the legal and material ability to issue orders.”83 There was no intimation by 
the Chamber that the SCSL Prosecutor did not act well within the bounds of good-faith in determining 
that Gbao and Kondewa qualified as bearing the “greatest responsibility” for crimes committed in Sierra 
Leone.
ICTY Rule 11bis and Referral Decisions
Neither the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), nor the ICTY included specific 
provisions in their founding documents limiting personal jurisdiction to select classes of individuals. 
Instead, both Tribunals were conferred the “power to prosecute persons responsible” for crimes under their 
respective subject matter and temporal jurisdictions.84 As a result, the ICTR and ICTY have indicted well 
over two hundred suspects in total.85 In response to the ballooning case loads of the two Tribunals, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 1503 in August of 2003, which instructed both Tribunals to “transfer[] 
cases involving those who may not [qualify as most senior leaders who are most responsible] to competent 
national jurisdictions.”86 The procedure for effectuating such transfers, through “Referral Benches” of judges, 
was then outlined in Rule 11 bis in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”) for both Tribunals.87 Rule 11 
bis(C) of the ICTY RPE states that the “Referral Bench shall, in accordance with Security Council resolution 
153488 (2004), consider the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the Accused” when 
determining whether transfer is appropriate.89 The ICTR on the other hand, has no similar jurisdictional 
language in its version of Rule 11 bis90 and consequently, referral decisions have instead focused on other 
considerations, such as fair trial and security concerns.91
The ICTY eventually referred thirteen accused to national jurisdictions, denied motions for referral 
concerning four accused and the prosecution withdrew its referral requests concerning five accused.92 ICTY 
Rule 11 bis referral decisions principally turned on determinations of whether the accused in each case were 
considered “most senior leaders . . . most responsible” for crimes under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.93 Moreover, 
the decision of an ICTY Referral Bench whether to refer each case proposed by the prosecutor has been 
interpreted as a “discretionary one.”94
In general terms, the more grave the charged crimes and the more directly an ICTY accused is implicated 
therein, the more likely such accused will be found ineligible for referral.95 However, ICTY Referral Benches 
struggled to determine the precise line to draw between cases of a seriousness necessitating adjudication at 
the Tribunal and those suitable for referral.96 Relevant factors considered by ICTY Referral Benches include: 
the number of alleged victims; the duration of the alleged criminal activity; the geographic scope of alleged 
criminal activity; and the accused’s alleged level of authority at the time(s) relevant to the indictment, when 
deciding whether referral is appropriate.97 If the alleged crimes in the indictment “do not cover a wide area and 
are limited in duration” then referral becomes “likely.”98 The process of assessing the relative gravity of charges 
in varying cases has not proved an easy task for ICTY judges. As noted by the Referral Bench in Prosecutor 
v Ademi & Norac, it is “impossible to measure the gravity of any crime in isolation” necessitating that each 
referral application “must also be viewed in the context of other cases tried by [the] Tribunal.”99 The Bench 
however, not explicitly compare the relevant factual allegations to any specific previous ICTY case, leaving the 
degree of comparison utilized unclear.100
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a. The Referrals of Ljubičić and Trbić
The two most serious ICTY cases referred to national jurisdictions were Prosecutor v Ljubičić and 
Prosecutor v Trbić. Paško Ljubičić held several roles within the Croatian military and at the time relevant to the 
indictment was allegedly a Military Police Battalion Commander in Central Bosnia.101 The indictment further 
alleged that a special “‘Anti-Terrorist Group’, also known as the ‘Jokers’” was created by Ljubičić, which, along 
with other personnel under Ljubičić’s command, were responsible for:
a series of attacks on Bosnian Muslim towns and villages...which were carried out in January and April 1993 
and resulted in the death of more than 100 civilians, detention and cruel treatment of a high number of men, 
destruction of villages, and religious institutions, plunder and forcible transfer of the population.102
Ljubičić was charged with 15 total counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes based on these 
facts.103 The Referral Bench found that, while Ljubičić “was a military commander and had a position of 
authority, in the context of other cases being tried before [the ICTY], it is not apparent that he was one of 
the most senior leaders who were the most responsible for the crimes within the [ICTY’s] jurisdiction” and 
referred his case to Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”).104
The Trbić case meanwhile, stands out as the only ICTY Rule 11 bis case involving genocide charges.105 
The indictment alleged that Milorad Trbić was “a duty officer in the [Serbian Army], holding the rank of 
captain” but that “[d]espite his nominal rank, it is alleged that in fact Trbić was subordinated to Lieutenant 
Drago Nikolić, and that he was responsible, inter alia, for helping manage the Military Police of the Zvornik 
Brigade.”106 Trbić was charged with being a member of two separate Joint Criminal Enterprises (JCEs), the 
objectives of which were “the summary execution and burial of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys 
captured from the Srebrenica enclave from 12 July 1995 until about 19 July 1995” and “the forcible removal 
of the Bosnian Muslim population from the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves to areas outside the control of 
Republika Srpska.”107 The Indictment alleged that Trbić:
assisted […] in organising, coordinating and facilitating the detention, transportation, summary execution 
and burial of [] Muslim victims[ and] acting individually or in concert with other members of the Joint 
Criminal Enterprise and Conspiracy[,] summarily execute[d] and bur[ied] the able-bodied Muslim men 
from Srebrenica.108
Specifically, the Referral Bench found that Trbić’s most significant involvement [was] alleged to have been 
at the Grbavci School in Orahovac on 14 July 1995, where it is claimed that he and Drago Nikolić personally 
supervised the Military Police in guarding Muslim prisoners and transporting them to a nearby field to 
be summarily executed; the Indictment further avers that the [Trbić] executed several of these prisoners 
himself.109 Trbić was charged with genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.110
The Referral Bench first noted that there is no official hierarchy of crimes under the ICTY’s jurisdiction, 
and therefore genocide charges do not necessarily render a case non-referable.111 Instead, the Bench opined 
that it “must instead look to the underlying conduct allegedly constituting a given crime, as well as the 
surrounding circumstances, to determine that crime’s gravity.”112 The Bench then noted that the crimes 
charged in the Trbić indictment were the “most serious” it had examined in the context of a referral request 
and were “among the gravest ever charged at [the ICTY].”113 The Bench however, still referred the case to BiH, 
finding that among the “literally hundreds of persons involved” in the Srebrenica genocide, Trbić’s “level of 
responsibility was relatively low” because Trbić had no significant role in “formulating the objectives of the 
[two] JCEs or in planning or orchestrating how they would be brought to fruition.”114
b. The Denial of Referral for Milošević, Delić and Lukić 
The ICTY denied referral requests made by the prosecution in regards to only four accused: Dragomir 
Milošević, Rasim Delić, Sredoje Lukić and Milan Lukić.115 In 2005, the ICTY Referral Bench denied the 
Prosecutor’s request to refer Dragomir Milošević’s case to BiH, holding “that the gravity of the crimes charged 
and the level of responsibility of the Accused, particularly when they are considered in combination, requires 
that the present case be tried at the [ICTY].”116 Milošević had been charged with fourteen counts of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, all in relation to the shelling and sniping campaign in Sarajevo from 1994 
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to 1995.117 The indictment alleged that troops under Milošević’s command had “shelled and sniped at civilians 
as they conducted their civilian activities such as tending vegetable plots, queuing for bread, collecting water, 
attending funerals, shopping in markets, riding on trams, riding bicycles, gathering wood, or simply walking 
with their children or friends.”118 The campaign was intended to spread terror among the civilian population 
and also included indiscriminate aerial bombardments with modified explosives not designed for use against 
civilian targets.119
Overall, the campaign directed by Milošević was of such a scale that “[i]n addition to the death and injuries 
that the shelling and sniping caused, the constant threat of death and injury caused extensive trauma and 
psychological damage to the inhabitants of Sarajevo.”120 The Referral Bench noted that the original indictment 
had only charged “a small representative number of individual incidents for specificity of pleading.”121
Milošević was alleged to have been the Chief of Staff of a wing of the Bosnian-Serb Army, the “Sarajevo-
Romanija Corps (‘SRK’) ... from around March 1993 and [became overall Commander of the] SRK on or 
about 10 August 1994.”122 Milošević commanded over 18,000 military personnel and also “negotiated, signed 
and implemented an anti-sniping agreement, local cease-fire agreements, and participated in negotiations 
relating to heavy weapons and access ... to territory around Sarajevo.”123 The Bench found that, although 
Milošević was subordinate to the supreme military and civilian commanders of the Bosnian-Serb forces, “the 
phrase ‘most senior leaders’ used by the Security Council is [not] restricted to individuals who are ‘architects’ 
of an ‘overall policy’ which forms the basis of alleged crimes.”124 Such an extreme restriction would, in the 
opinion of the Bench, “diminish the true level of responsibility of many commanders in the field and those 
at staff level, [who] de jure and de facto, are alleged to have exercised such a degree of authority that it is 
appropriate to describe them as among the ‘most senior’, rather than ‘intermediate’.”125
The Bench also found that the crimes Milošević was charged with were of a gravity that “stand[s] out 
when compared with other cases before the [ICTY]” based on the extreme carnage wrought during the 
besieging of Sarajevo, which “‘killed and wounded thousands of civilians of both sexes and all ages’ and caused 
extensive material destruction,” over a period of fifteen months.126 The Bench noted that the violence against 
civilians also escalated once Milošević assumed local command.127 Finally, the fact that the specific crimes 
and underlying factual allegations contained in the indictment may had been already “fully addressed” by the 
ICTY in a previous case was dismissed by the Bench as “irrelevant.”128 Based on these findings, the Bench held 
that Milošević fell into the category of individuals Rule 11 bis “requires” be tried at the ICTY.129
In 2007, the ICTY Referral Bench denied the Prosecutor’s request to refer the case against Rasim Delić 
to the authorities of BiH.130 According to the indictment, Delić was “commander of the Main Staff of the 
Army of [BiH] from 8 June 1993 until his retirement on 1 September 2000.”131 In this position, Delić was 
“subordinate only to the President of [BiH]” and “exercised military command and control over all regular 
[Army] forces [of BiH].”132 In 1993, Delić also allegedly created “the ‘El Mujahed Detachment’, comprised of 
foreign volunteers who were prepared to conduct ‘Holy War’ against the enemies of Bosnian Muslims” and 
which subsequently “committed killings, maltreatment and rape of civilians and/or enemy soldiers who were 
captured or had surrendered.”133
Delić was charged with four counts of war crimes.134 The allegations in the indictment “involve[d] around 
100 victims of murder, cruel treatment and rape […] committed in four locations in Central Bosnia and over 
a time-span not exceeding three months in 1993 and 1995.”135 Unlike the Milošević case, the Bench held that 
Delić’s status as a “most senior leader” independently precluded referral, despite the fact that the charged 
crimes were of a similar gravity to those in previously referred cases.136
The third case in which the ICTY denied a prosecution referral request involved cousins Milan and 
Sredoje Lukić, and initially ordered to be referred to BiH by the Referral Bench.137 Milan Lukić sought to keep 
his case at the Tribunal and successfully appealed the Bench’s decision to the ICTY Appeals Chamber.138 Milan 
Lukić allegedly formed a paramilitary group known alternatively as the “White Eagles” or “Avengers” and 
Sredoje Lukić was alleged to have been a member of this group.139 Both men were alleged to have, along with 
others, “brutally killed some 140 persons and [] severely injured others in two incidents by barricading them 
in houses and setting the homes on fire. Milan Lukić [was] additionally charged with having killed another 13 
persons in three incidents.”140 The Referral Bench found these crimes “very serious” but ultimately concluded 
that neither accused was a “most senior leader”, and ordered referral.141
The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Referral Bench’s appraisal of gravity, but found the Bench’s 
“conclusory” summation of Milan Lukić’s degree of authority had improperly presupposed that “local” 
paramilitary leaders could never be considered “most senior leaders.”142 The Appeals Chamber found that 
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“within his own sphere, [Milan Lukić] was a dominant presence” and that the Referral Bench had placed 
“undue emphasis on [the] geographic scope” of the alleged crimes.143 The Chamber then noted that the White 
Eagles had acted with impunity and answered to no higher authority for over two years, making Milan Lukić 
“perhaps the most important paramilitary leader indicted at the [ICTY].”144 The Appeals Chamber concluded 
consequently held that the case against Milan Lukić was “too significant to be appropriate for referral” and 
reversed the Referral Bench’s decision.145
c. Prosecutorial Discretion at the ICC
The ICC has “jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern.”146 The 
Rome Statute instructs the ICC Prosecutor to determine whether there are “substantial reasons to believe” that 
beginning an investigation would “serve the interests of justice” while “taking into account the gravity of the 
crime and the interests of victims.”147 In 2003, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor released a Policy Paper defining 
its “general strategy” of evaluating potential cases for investigation, stating:
Although any crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court is a serious matter, the [Rome] Statute clearly 
foresees and requires an additional consideration of ‘gravity’ whereby the Office must determine that a case 
is of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. In the view of the Office, factors relevant in 
assessing gravity include: the scale of the crimes; the nature of the crimes; the manner of commission of the 
crimes; and the impact of the crimes.148
In a subsequent publication, the Office further stated that it will “investigate and prosecute those who bear 
the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes ... [encompassing] those situated at the highest echelons 
of responsibility, including those who ordered, financed, or otherwise organized the alleged crimes.”149 These 
two publications further confirm the general focus of scarce prosecutorial resources within ICL practice on 
pursuing prosecutions of individuals who are key players in the perpetration of relatively serious crimes and 
fall in line with personal jurisdiction jurisprudence from the SCSL and ICTY.
Themes of International Personal Jurisdictional Jurisprudence
From an overview of practice at the SCSL, ICTY and to a lesser extent, ICC, a set of qualitative legal 
factors to be considered in determining whether an individual is properly considered “most responsible” can 
be gleaned. Generally, it is clear that individuals qualify as “most responsible” when implicated in especially 
serious crimes. To evaluate the conduct of an individual suspect, the two most important factors to consider 
are the relative gravity of the crimes the suspect is implicated in and the relative importance of the suspect’s 
alleged role in contributing to their commission. Gravity has been assessed in terms of the number of victims 
affected, the impact of the crimes on victims, the duration and geographic scope of the criminal conduct and 
nature and manner of perpetration.
While thus far, judges have avoided engaging in grim mathematical accounting by simply comparing 
death tolls or the overall number of victims affected, these assessments must be made using other ICL 
cases as reference points, especially those prosecuted by the same court or tribunal. A suspect’s role 
is evaluated by considering his degree of authority over others involved in the underlying criminal 
conduct and whether the suspect played a part in the decision-making process that ultimately led to 
the perpetration of the alleged crimes. Furthermore, these two factors of gravity and responsibility have 
been viewed holistically, rather than cumulatively. Aside from these qualitative assessments, a clear 
preference for prosecution is also evident, as only the ICTY has declined to prosecute a suspect based 
on finding him not amongst those “most responsible” and this finding merely resulted in the suspect’s 
prosecution in domestic courts. This is a major distinction between the ICTY’s Rule 11 bis decisions 
and the fate of Cases 003/004 at the ECCC, as there is a fundamental difference between a change from 
an international to national prosecutorial venue and the functional cessation of criminal proceedings 
against a person implicated in international crimes. There has never been any suggestion that if some or 
all Case 003/004 suspects are not committed to trial, they may nonetheless be prosecuted by an ordinary 
Cambodian criminal court. Instead, should the cases be ended prior to trial at the ECCC, the suspects 
would escape potential criminal liability altogether. This would be a major departure from the core 
principle of individual responsibility that defines ICL, as to date no case at one of the major international 
courts or tribunals has ever been dismissed prior based on a relative assessment of culpability despite the 
existence of sufficient evidence to otherwise warrant a trial.
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 The Presumed Suspects in Cases 003 and 004
Although Cases 003/004 both continue to languish in the investigative phase and therefore the identities of 
the suspects in the two cases remain technically confidential, the names of all five suspects in Cases 003 and 004 
have been publicly reported in numerous news articles and some reported suspects have even granted interviews 
to journalists.150 Indeed, this public knowledge goes well beyond mere speculation, as the Initial Submissions 
of the Office of the Co-Prosecutor initiating each case was leaked to New Zealand-based news website Scoop, 
which subsequently posted the documents for open public download on its website on 27 June 2011.151 In light 
of this publically available and widespread knowledge, this paper will discuss the roles of the currently presumed 
suspects. Originally Case 003 concerned two suspects: Meas Muth and Sou Met and Case 004 concerned three 
suspects: Ta An, Im Chaem and Ta Tith. Sou Met died from complications related to diabetes sometime in June 
2013.152 The following is an overview of the identities and roles within the Khmer Rouge of the four surviving 
probable suspects drawn from the leaked documents and other publicly available information.
Case 003: Meas Muth and Sou Met
On 16 February 2012, Case 002 accused Nuon Chea’s defense counsel named Meas Muth as one of the 
two suspects in Case 003 during oral argument, apparently confirming the accuracy of the leaked Case 003 
Initial Submission.153 Meas Muth has also long been considered a potential suspect at the ECCC candidate, as 
the case against him was previewed in a book on accountability for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge authored 
by researcher Steve Heder and lawyer Brian Tittemore.154
Heder and Tittemore allege that Meas Muth, along with his deceased co-suspect Sou Met, rose through 
the ranks of the Khmer Rouge’s Southwest Zone hierarchy155 and “held predominantly military ranks ... 
just below the senior level, which positioned them to implement [Khmer Rouge] policies and influence the 
conduct of lower-level cadre.”156 Meas Muth became “Secretary of Central Committee Division 164, which 
incorporated the [Khmer Rouge] navy” and was also the son of a prominent Khmer Rouge official named 
Pang, who died in 1968.157 According to a report published by Human Rights Watch, Meas Muth commanded 
“8,000 to 10,000” troops.158
Case 004: Ta An, Im Chaem and Ta Tith
Ta An, Im Chaem and Ta Tith are all named as suspects in the Third Introductory Submission of the 
International Co-Prosecutor leaked by Scoop. On 30 January 2012, the Nuon Chea defense also named Ta 
An and Im Chaem as suspects in Case 004 during questioning of Case 002 witness Prak Yut.159 The names of 
these individuals have also repeatedly been published in news articles; along with the name of reported third 
Case 004 suspect Ta Tith.160
Ta An is alleged to have risen to the post of Deputy Secretary of the Central Zone in 1977, where 
approximately 150,000 people, including large numbers of Cham Muslims, were massacred in a series of 
executions.161 Im Chaem is alleged to have become the Secretary of Preah Net Preah district in Banteay 
Meanchey province during the 1977 Khmer Rouge purge of the Northwest Zone, where she is reported 
to have “overs[een] five labor camps and prisons where nearly 50,000 people died.”162 Finally, according to 
Khmer Rouge researcher Ben Kiernan, Ta Tith was the brother-in-law of infamous Khmer Rouge Standing 
Committee member and Southwest Zone Secretary Ta Mok and initially held the position of Secretary of 
Kirivong (District 109) in the Southwest Zone.163 Later, Ta Tith reportedly became Deputy Secretary of the 
Northwest Zone, where he “had knowledge of, ordered and possibly directly participated in the torture and 
mutilation of prisoners.”164
Gravity of Crimes Implicated in Cases 003 and 004
Just as the names of the suspects in Cases 003 and 004 have been widely reported, the factual bases 
underlying the cases are also largely matters of public knowledge. Regarding Case 003, then-acting ECCC 
International Co-Prosecutor William Smith issued a press release on 8 September 2009 stating that the 
prosecution had “request[ed] judicial investigation of eight (8) distinct factual situations of murder, torture, 
unlawful detention, forced labour and persecution, [which] if proved, would constitute crimes against 
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code.”165 
Former International Co-Prosecutor Andrew Cayley subsequently issued a press release providing further 
information relevant to Case 003 on 9 May 2011.166 Then-Co-Investigating Judges You and Blunk quickly 
admonished Cayley for releasing this information, but confirmed that the Case 003 investigation includes:
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S-21 Security Centre, Kampong Chhang Airport Construction Site, purges of the East, Central and New 
North Zones, and incursions into Vietnam [which were also implicated in Cases 001 and 002], as well as the 
following new crime sites and criminal episodes: (1) S-22 Security Centre in the Phnom Penh area; (2) Wat 
Eng Tea Ngnien Security Centre in Kampong Som Province; (3) Stung Hav Rock Quarry forced labour site 
in Kampong Som Province; (4) Capture of foreign nationals off the coast of Cambodia and their unlawful 
imprisonment transfer to S-21 or murder; and (5) Security Centres operated in Rattanakiri Province.167
Cayley’s press release also discussed Case 004, stating that the prosecution had requested “investigation 
of thirty-two (32) distinct factual situations of murder, torture, unlawful detention, forced labour, and 
persecution [which] if proved, would constitute crimes against humanity, violations of the 1956 Cambodian 
Penal Code and genocide.”168 The two judges also published a list of crime sites and topics of investigation for 
Case 004, which includes eighteen security centres, two prisons, six execution sites and four dam construction/
forced labour sites.169 The CIJs also indicated that the Case 004 investigation involves allegations of genocide 
perpetrated against Cham Muslims in Kampong Cham province and crimes committed during the Khmer 
Rouge purges of the Central and Northwest Zones.170
Security Centres, Prisons and Execution Sites
Security centres were created throughout Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge and were in reality, prisons 
and work camps used to detain, torture and execute perceived enemies. Typically, execution sites were located 
near detention centres and consisted of a series of mass graves containing anywhere from several dozen to 
tens of thousands of victims in each. For example, the Documentation Center of Cambodia (“DC-Cam”) 
has estimated that at Tuol Ta Phuong Prison and Execution Site, which is among the Case 004 investigation 
sites, there are 250 to 500 mass graves containing between 50,000 and 150,000 victims executed by the Khmer 
Rouge.171 Other prison sites under investigation related to Cases 003/004 were the sites of similarly massive 
killing events during the DK period.172
Purges
Internal party purges were also a major source of death and suffering during the reign of the Khmer 
Rouge. The purges of the Northwest and Central Zones, within the purview of Cases 003 and 004, were two 
of the three largest purges (along with the 1978 purge of the Eastern Zone) and involved mass killing and 
misery on a shocking scale. According to Kiernan, the standard purge process adopted by the Khmer Rouge 
was to send trusted cadres under the command of Ta Mok or Northern Zone Secretary Ke Pauk into an area 
and thereafter systematically arrest and execute local officials.173 In 1976, Ke Pauk led a violent purge of the 
Central Zone and in 1977 Ta Mok’s forces purged the Northwest Zone.174 Kiernan estimates that the death toll 
“probably exceeded one hundred thousand” victims in 1977 alone during the purge of the Northwest Zone.175
Worksites
Worksites and forced labour camps were another feature of the Khmer Rouge regime, which caused 
mass death through both on-site executions and the convergence of overwork, famine, disease and complete 
lack of medical care.176 The purview of Case 004 covers Anglong Chrey, Trapeang Thma, Spean Spreng and 
Prey Roneam Khmer Rouge dam construction sites.177 These locations were massive worksites involving huge 
numbers of forced labourers. For example, according to Human Rights Watch, Case 004 suspect Im Chaem 
assumed responsibility for the construction of Trapeang Thma dam in mid-1977 and “[t]he very harsh conditions 
imposed on the laborers allegedly under her control resulted in many deaths. Some laborers were executed at the 
water-control work site for complaining about conditions or being unable to cope with the demands.”178
Genocide of Cham Muslims
In addition to the various international crimes committed at security centres, prisons, execution 
sites, worksites and during purges, Cases 003/004 stand out as involving allegations of genocidal killings of 
Cham Muslims, a minority ethno-religious group in Cambodia who died at a much higher rate than ethnic 
Khmer-Cambodians under the Khmer Rouge period.179 Indeed, the Khmer Rouge treated Cham Muslims 
with particular scorn and there is ample evidence suggesting that the regime committed genocide against 
the Chams.180 Crimes related to the alleged Khmer Rouge genocide of the Cham are included in both Cases 
003 and 004 and Ta An specifically has been implicated in overseeing large-scale massacres, including many 
thousands of Cham Muslims.181
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Conclusion
Based on even a brief overview of known information related to ECCC Cases 003/004, it appears that all 
four surviving suspects in the cases clearly qualify as “most responsible” individuals. First, it appears to be un-
contradicted that all four suspects were Khmer Rouge “officials” during the period from 1975 to 1979. Second 
and more importantly, the alleged crimes involved – including crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide -are amongst the most serious crimes in existence, covered large geographic areas, were committed 
over multiple years and involved millions of total victims, including the deaths of hundreds of thousands of 
victims according to former International Co-Prosecutor Robert Petit.182 Indeed, journalist Douglas Gillison 
has estimated through his research that between 248,990 and 295,190 deaths are involved in the Case 004 
allegations alone.183
The sheer force of these numbers makes Cases 003/004 stand out among recent prosecutions for 
international crimes as especially grave. The ICTY for example, found Milan Lukić, Dragomir Milošević and 
Rasim Delić to all qualify as being amongst those “most responsible” for crimes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia and declined to refer their cases to national jurisdictions for prosecution. These conclusions 
were despite the fact that all three cases involved far less grave crimes than ECCC Cases 003/004 in terms 
of duration, total numbers of victims and the death toll, even though a referral decision resulted solely in 
a change of venue for trial to a domestic court and not cessation of prosecutions altogether. Moreover, the 
SCSL Prosecutor, operating pursuant an undoubtedly narrower jurisdictional policy, brought charges against 
twelve accused, two more than the total of ten suspects at the ECCC and the propriety of doing so was never 
in any serious doubt. In particular, the Prosecutor did not exceed the bounds of jurisdictional discretion in 
bringing cases against Augustine Gbao and Allieu Kondewa, who appear to have been subordinated to the 
highest echelons of power in Sierra Leone, just as the suspects in Cases 003/004 were within the Khmer Rouge 
hierarchy.
Equally importantly, while the overall number of death toll of the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia, 
estimated at 1.7 to 2.2 million lives, dwarfs the total number of deaths in both Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, 
making grim comparisons of relative culpability based on death toll percentages between the ECCC, ICTY 
and SCSL impracticable, ECCC Cases 003/004 still involve far more deaths than Case 001. Indeed, presumed 
Case 003 suspect Meas Muth is directly implicated in some of the crimes prosecuted in Case 001, as he 
allegedly sent victims to S-21 prison to be tortured and executed.184 In Case 001, the Trial Chamber found 
that “at least 12,273” victims were killed under Duch’s authority.185 The ECCC Supreme Court Chamber 
summarily dismissed Duch’s claim on appeal that the ECCC Co-Prosecutors and/or Co-Investigating Judges 
abused their discretion in considering Duch a “most responsible” person and committing him to trial. Thus, 
it would appear to be irreconcilable for Duch to be sentenced to life in prison as a person properly considered 
“most responsible” for the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge by the Co-Prosecutors and Co-Investigating Judges 
if individuals, some of whom appear to have been Duch’s superiors, and all of whom appear to be directly 
implicated in equally, if not far more, grave criminal behaviour than Duch, including potential responsibility 
for tens of thousands more deaths, have the cases against them dismissed.
In sum, it appears former ECCC International Co-Prosecutor Robert Petit was correct in asserting that 
that all of the suspects in Cases 003/004 “fall well under the jurisdiction of the ECCC.”186 Furthermore, Judge 
Laurent Kasper-Ansermet’s outgoing decisions holding that both suspects in Case 003 qualified as “most 
responsible”187 also appears strongly supported in both law and fact and it is difficult to envision any scenario 
wherein sound professional judgment led to any other conclusion. As such, while trials in Cases 003/004 may 
be politically inconvenient for certain interested parties, trials in both cases appear to be the only defensible 
course of action at this juncture and any other outcome should be viewed as a product of bad faith or unsound 
professional judgment. Thus, while Case 002 undoubtedly remains the ECCC’s flagship case, Cases 003/004 
may very well determine the Court’s credibility as a legal institution and shape its ultimate legacy.
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